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Damned if you do and damned if you don’t:
Medical ethics and a second career
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, and Bruce W. Richman, MA,
Houston, TexEven when laws have been written down, they ought
not always to remain unaltered. Aristotle from
“Politics”
November of 2004, Ernie Fletcher, MD, Governor
of Kentucky, fulfilled the duties of his office by signing
the execution order for a man duly convicted of capital
murder. In so doing, Dr. Fletcher appears en passant to
have violated American Medical Association ethical
guidelines prohibiting any manner of physician partic-
ipation in capital punishment. Nevertheless, Kentucky
state law also requires that its physicians conform to all
ethical standards of the AMA or face disciplinary ac-
tion, including possible license revocation, by the state
medical board. Dr. Fletcher may forfeit his license to
practice medicine in Kentucky if it is determined that he
has violated AMA ethics guidelines in fulfilling his
responsibilities as governor and authorizing the con-
victed murderer’s execution. At the time of this writ-
ing, execution of the condemned man has been stayed
by the court and the signed warrant has expired.
Should the stay be subsequently lifted and the governor
asked to sign a new death warrant at a later date, what
would be his best course of action to insure satisfaction
of his responsibilities to both his professions, to insure
compliance with all applicable laws, and to demonstrate
the high sense of ethical development expected of phy-
sicians and elected officials?
A. Sign the death warrant in his capacity as governor and
surrender his medical license.
B. Sign the death warrant with the expectation that a
collegial state medical board will interpret this act as a
non-violation of AMA ethical standards.
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556C. Don’t sign the warrant. Let the next non-physician
governor order the execution.
D. Pressure the state legislature to abolish the death pen-
alty.
E. Pressure the state legislature to abolish the requirement
that Kentucky physicians must abide by AMA ethical
guidelines to maintain state licensure.
It is not uncommon for physicians to be recruited for
positions outside the medical profession which require
almost no exercise of their clinical abilities, but which prize
the physician’s presumptive intellect, problem-solving
skills, capacity for hard work, and integrity. Physicians have
distinguished themselves very prominently in all sorts of
responsible non-medical second occupations. Within the
last few years a surgeon has been elevated to leadership of
the majority party in the US Senate and a family practitioner
has been a leading candidate for the nation’s presidency.
Eight physicians currently serve in Congress, and at least
eight have served as state governors in the course of Amer-
ican history. The concept is not unique – virtually everyone
in elective politics has come to it from some other liveli-
hood. The physician-in-a-second-role commonly retains
identification as a physician, but when medical practice
stops so do its obligations. Governor Fletcher of Kentucky
maintains a license to practice medicine in the state.
Admired though physicians may be, our professional
role and its obligations can be deeply incompatible with
new job responsibilities of a government leader. This de-
gree of potential role conflict of physicians-in-a-second-
role exceeds that of most other professions. Unlike profes-
sional/personal conflicts in which both aspects must and
can be satisfied, 1 social role incompatibilities often require
meeting one obligation at the expense of the other. Seem-
ingly well-suited for other lines of work, our ethical obliga-
tions are in fact unique to the medical profession and likely
will present conflicts with professions outside medicine, as
Governor Fletcher and the citizens of Kentucky are in the
process of discovering.
As a current medical licensee in Kentucky, Governor
Fletcher remains subject to the regulations of the Com-
monwealth Board of Medical Licensure. KRS 311.97 de-
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ical, or unprofessional conduct” as including “but not
limited to the following acts by a licensee: . . . (4) . . . any
departure from, or failure to conform to principles of
medical ethics of the American Medical Association. . . .”. 2
The American Medical Association’s Code of Medical
Ethics (Section E-206) states that
[A]n individual’s opinion on capital punishment is the
personal moral decision of the individual. A physician, as a
member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when
there is hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a
legally authorized execution. Physician participation in ex-
ecution is defined generally as actions which would fall into
one or more of the following categories: (1) an action
which would directly cause the death of the condemned;
(2) an action which would assist, supervise, or contribute to
the ability of another individual to directly cause the death
of the condemned; (3) an action which could automatically
cause an execution to be carried out on a condemned
prisoner.3
A number of other American and international associ-
ations of physicians have also addressed the ethics of phy-
sician involvement in capital punishment. All have con-
demned participation by practicing physicians which is not
identical with non-practicing participation. Each has ap-
pealed to the ethics of medicine and obligations that define
the practicing physician’s social role. The American College
of Physicians and American Society of Internal Medicine
cite the core ethical principle governing the relationship
between physicians and our culture: “Society has conferred
professional prerogatives on physicians with the expecta-
tion that they will use their position for the benefit of
patients”.4 These learned organizations confine their deter-
minations to the activities of the medical profession, avoid-
ing direct confrontation with the wider societal ethics of
capital punishment itself.
Not all physicians accept the constraints of professional
integrity in assessing their willingness to become involved
in capital punishment. In Farber, et al.’s large physician
survey, 41% reported that they would perform at least one
execution-related action not permitted by AMA ethical
standards, and 25% would agree to perform five or more of
the proscribed actions. Only 3% were aware that there were
professional ethical guidelines on capital punishment.5
Many respondents reported that their willingness to partic-
ipate in executions was substantially based on a belief that
capital punishment reduces murder rates. Whether the
deterrent effect of capital punishment is any more effective
than life imprisonment has been intensely disputed by
criminologists, and there is even considerable data that
judicial execution may actually increase murder rates.6
If so many doctors would agree to contribute their
knowledge and skills to legally sanctioned capital punish-
ment, is the AMA’s argument that execution is incompat-
ible with the physician’s role ethically durable? The core of
the position adopted by the AMA and other medical soci-
eties is based in the ancient tenet that physicians should
never use their specialized knowledge and skills to inten-tionally harm a person without some modicum of compen-
sating clinical benefit. No such paradigm justifies physician
participation in capital punishment.
Dr. Fletcher’s legal counsel’s answer to criticism has
been that “By signing a death warrant, in no way is Gover-
nor Fletcher participating in the conduct of an execution.”
Perhaps the attorney is thinking in terms of whether the
governor is actually administering the fatal injection or
otherwise exercising a physician’s knowledge and skill in
facilitating the condemned man’s death. Clearly Governor
Fletcher is not, and that raises the question of whether
professional policy-setting bodies like the AMA should be
governing the behavior of physicians when they are not
performing within the physician’s traditional roles.
The AMA obviously anticipated the question, and a
scenario eerily similar to the one involving Governor
Fletcher, when it included among its prohibitions “super-
vision” and contributions “to the ability of another individ-
ual to directly cause the death of the condemned,” which is
justifiable because medicine can be practiced through a
supervisory educational role. The 3rd AMA prohibition,
“any action which would automatically cause an execution
to be carried out on a condemned prisoner” is likely in
response to the dilemma faced by prison psychiatrists when
their therapy improves the symptoms of psychotic death
row inmates and thereby renders them eligible for execu-
tion. In this special circumstance, psychiatrists violate the
taboo against use of medical knowledge and skill to harm
prisoners without actually participating or supervising par-
ticipants in an execution. By providing an otherwise indi-
cated therapy the condemned prisoner becomes a patient
and the physician’s fiduciary role is conflicted by unfetter-
ing the law.
Dutifully signing a death warrant as chief executive of
the state, however, neither involves the practice of medicine
or its supervision, nor confers the status of patient on the
prisoner. On closer scrutiny, Governor Fletcher’s signing
the death warrant violates at worst the letter and not the
spirit of the prohibition. If the AMA’s third prohibition was
intended literally as written, a physician on jury duty adju-
dicating capital murder would be unable to render a guilty
verdict without violating the prohibition, which is permit-
ted.3 We argue that this prohibition is heavily context
dependent and is not automatically universally applicable.
The state board does not demand automatic forfeiture
of the medical license with every breach of AMA ethical
standards – the system of review and penalty is graduated,
with revocation only the most severe among several actions
available to the board. Option A is therefore an extreme and
unnecessary response, serving no one’s legitimate interest.
Option C is a clear violation of the ethical obligations of his
role as governor, subverting law, and possibly generating
undesired legal and political consequences. Option D, ask-
ing the legislature to abolish the death penalty, may or may
not represent the governor’s legislative goals, but it is
irrelevant to the question at hand here. Petulance and
impulsivity are common responses to frustrating situations,
but they are seldom fruitful, and certainly cannot be ex-
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the legislature to eliminate the requirement for physician
compliance with AMA ethical standards, would constitute a
statutory response to a personal aggravation, represent an
abuse of gubernatorial power, and jettison one of the most
carefully considered and comprehensive codices of medical
ethics ever compiled, without proposing an equivalent re-
placement. Choosing Option B, signing the death warrant,
provided it is legally and morally just, fulfills his obligation
as governor and exemplifies the courage necessary for both
his social roles. He can present his case for peer review
before the state medical board with the expectation of a
successful verdict.
The force of the AMA’s 2nd and 3rd prohibition turns
on something else: an implicit but not argued opposition to
capital punishment itself, no matter who is involved or the
extent of their involvement. The inconsistent AMA ethical
position does not actually condemn capital punishment. It
does advocate its societal abolition by the extraordinary
manner in which it distances its members from using med-
ical knowledge to kill those society has decided are unfit to
live. We will not attempt to address the possible inconsis-
tency abortion poses. The AMA notes that individual opin-
ions about the appropriateness and societal value of capital
punishment may vary, and makes no effort to influence thisongoing cultural debate, as perhaps it should instead of
largely limiting political activities to economic issues affect-
ing medicine.
Addendum: Shortly after the writing of this article,
physician Governor Ernie Fletcher courageously fulfilled
his gubernatorial duties and petitioned the Kentucky State
Medical Board to consider the status of his medical liscence.
The Board voted unanimously that Dr. Fletcher had not
violated the ethical code of the AMA and absolved him of
any misconduct.
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